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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is consisting
of independent and distributed sensors to monitor physical or
environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound,
pressure, etc. The most crucial and fundamental challenge
facing WSN is security. Due to minimum capacity in-term of
memory cost, processing and physical accessibility to sensors
devices the security attacks are problematic. They are mostly
deployed in open area, which expose them to different kinds of
attacks. In this paper, we present an illustration of different
attacks and vulnerabilities in WSN. Then we describe and
analyze security requirement, countermeasures based on
cryptography mechanisms in literature. Finally, we present
possible directions in future research.
Key Words— wireless sensor network, security of
communications, public key management, key establishment
I. INTRODUCTION
Inexpensiveness, energy efficiency, and consistency in
performance is the need of the day for electronic
communication. This has led to the advancement of wireless
technologies and micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS).
Which in turn made it possible to make low power tiny devices
that runs autonomously. Which evolve a new class of
distributed networking named wireless sensor networks
(WSNs).
Today we find this kind of network in a wide range of
potential applications, including security and surveillance,
control, actuation and maintenance of complex systems and
fine-grain monitoring of indoor and outdoor environments. The
majority of these applications are deployed to monitor an area
and to have a reaction when they register a critical event. The
data does not need to be confidential in areas such as capturing
indoor and outdoor environmental events. However, the
confidentiality of data can be essential in other applications,
such as for the security of a territory in military [1] [2].
Security is one of the most crucial challenge that WSN
is facing. Sensor networks are highly vulnerable against
attacks, it is very important to have certain mechanisms that
can protect the network from all kinds of attack. It must be
ensure that the system is protected from any kind of attacks.
The most important tools that ensure security and its services
are the cryptography mechanisms. In this work, we focus on
study and analysis cryptography algorithms used in WSN.
This paper is organized as follows. In summary, the
chapter makes the following contributions:
 It proposes threat models and security goals for
WSNs.
 It identifies various possible attacks and
vulnerabilities in WSN.
 It presents a detailed security analysis and
comparison of all the major cryptography
algorithms for WSN.
 It ends with a conclusion and future works.
II. SECURITY GOALS FOR WSN
A sensor network is a special type of network. It shares
some commonalities with a typical computer network, but also
poses unique requirements. Therefore, we can think of the
requirements of a wireless sensor network as encompassing
both the typical network requirements and the unique
requirements suited solely to wireless sensor networks. We
can classify the security goals into two goals: main and
secondary. The main goals include security objectives that
should be available in any system (confidentiality, availability,
integrity and authentication). The other category includes
secondary goals (self-organization, secure localization, Time
synchronization and Resilience to attacks) [2] [3].
A. Data confidentiality
To ensure that the content of the message should not be
revealed to the unauthorized receiver. Some secure data
aggregation schemes provide this property in hop-by-hop,
basis in which any aggregator node needs to decrypt the
received encrypted data before applying the aggregate
function on it, then encrypt the aggregated data before
transmitting it to the higher-level aggregator or directly to the
base station. While the other schemes provide end-to-end
data confidentiality in which any aggregator node directly
apply the aggregation function to the received encrypted data.
B. Data integrity
Data integrity guarantees that the message has not been
altered during the propagation. But if data aggregation is
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employed then it is not possible to have end-to-end data
integrity since data aggregation yields in alteration. The data
should be accessible only to authorized users.
C. Source authentication
Enables sensor node to ensure the identity of the peer
node that it is communicating with. A compromised node can
launch Sybil attack in which it may send data under several
fake identities in order to corrupt the aggregated data.
D. Availability
To guarantee the survivability of network services
against Denial-of-Service attacks. The attack aiming at an
aggregator can make some part of the network losses its
availability because the aggregator is responsible to
provide the measurement of that network part.
E. Data freshness
It is also needed that the data is recent and no old
message have been replayed. To achieve this goal a nonce,
or another time related counter is added to the packet.
F. Self Organization
According to different situations a wireless sensor
networks requires every sensor node to be independent and
flexible enough to be self-organizing and self-healing. As
it is a typically an ad hoc network. In sensor network there
is no fixed infrastructure available for the purpose of
network management, which make wireless sensor
network security more challenging.
G.Time synchronization
Most of the sensor network applications depends on
some form of time synchronization. Sensor may also
require to computer end-to-end delay of a packet as it
travels between pairwise sensors.
H.Secure Localization
The utility of a sensor network mostly rely on its ability
that it automatically and accurately locate each sensor in
the network. In order to point out the accurate fault a
sensor network designed will need accurate location
information. An attacker can easily exploit this situation
and can easily manipulate non-secured location
information by either reporting false signal strengths or
replaying signals.
III. DIFFERENT KIND OF ATTACKS AND
VULNERABILITIES IN WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS
The different characteristics of wireless sensor
networks (energy limited, low-power computing, use of
radio waves, etc...) expose them to many security threats.
The two general categories of attacks that are possible
on a wireless network are active and passive attacks
listening and monitoring the communication channel by
unauthorized attackers is considered as passive attack.
These attacks make it possible to retrieve data from the
network but do not influence over its behavior. In active
kind of attack the unauthorized attacker, neither only
listen and monitor but also modifies the data in the
communication channels. Unlike passive attacks, they
directly hinder the provisioning of services. Active
attacks can be classified into the following kinds. [4] [5]
[6].
A. Routing Attacks in sensor networks
1. Spoofed, Altered, Or Replayed Routing Information
The most direct attack against a routing protocol is to
target the routing information exchanged between nodes.
By spoofing, altering, or replaying routing information,
adversaries may be able to create routing loops, attract or
repel network traffic, extend or shorten source routes,
generate false error messages, and partition the network,
increase end-to-end latency and so on.
2. Selective Forwarding
Only certain packets can be drop selectively by a
malicious node. This is effective specially if is combined
with an attack which gather much traffic through the node.
It is assumed in sensor networks that nodes sincerely
forward and receive messages. In situation where some of
the compromised node refused to forward packet the
neighbors may start using another route. [7] [8]
3. Spoofed, replayed and altered routing information
Ad hoc routing that is unprotected is vulnerable to these
kind of attacks because every node act as a router and
hence can directly affect routing information. Like:
 Extend or shorten service routes
 Generate false error messages
 Create routing loops
 Increase end-to-end latency
4. Sybil Attacks
This kind of attack targets fault tolerant schemes like
multi path routing, distributed storage and topology
maintenance. A node duplicate itself and present in the
multiple locations. In the network a single node, present
multiple identities in a Sybil attack as shown in figure 1.
To prevent Sybil attack authentication and encryption
techniques can be used. [7]
Fig. 1. Sybil attack
5. Sinkhole Attack
Sinkhole attack is to attract traffic to a specific node.
The main goal of the attacker here is to attract nearly all
the traffic from a particular area through a compromised
node. This can be done by making the compromised node
the most attractive to the neighbor nodes.
6. Wormhole Attack
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In this kind of attack an attacker records packet at one
location, tunnel them to another location in the network
and then retransmit them into the network as shown in
figure 2.
Fig. 2. Wormhole attack
7. Hello flood attack
In hello flood attack, the attacker uses hello packets as a
weapon to convince the sensors in the network. Attacker
sends a routing protocol hello packet from one node to
another with more energy. An attacker with a high
processing power and transmission range sends Hello
packets to a number of sensor node that are isolated in a
large area within the network. The sensors thus get
convinced that the adversary is their neighbor. As a result,
the victim nodes try to go through the attacker, as they
know that it is their neighbor while sending the
information to the base station (BS) as shown in figure 3.
Fig. 3. Hello flood attack
A. Denial of service Attack
In this kind of attack, the objective of the malicious
adversary is to avoid the provisioning of service. The most
common and basic dos attacks can be:
1. Power exhaustion attack
An attacker impose a complex task to a sensor node in
order to use its battery life. As we are aware of the fact
sensor are low power devices with limited supply of
energy. In addition, sensor nodes are limited with
computational capabilities, so this attack can slow down
the reaction time.
2. Jamming Attack
This is the primary physical layer DoS attack against
WSN. In this kind of attack, the attacker emits radio
frequency signals that do not follow an underlying MAC
protocol, which lead to a problem that none of the member
of the network in the affected area will be able to send or
receive any packet. In other words, the adversary tires to
transmit signals to the receiving antenna at the same
frequency band or sub band as the transmitter, which
causes radio interference. The attacker needs high energy
to disrupt continuously the network. [9]
B. Node subversion
In this kind of attack, the whole sensor network may be
compromised because the capture node may reveal
cryptographic keys.
C.Node Malfunction
In this kind of attack a malfunction node, generate
inaccurate data, which can risk the integrity of sensor
network. This is more significant if the node is data
aggregating node like cluster leader.
D.Node Outage
In this kind of attack a situation, occur where the node
stops its function. Hence, the sensor network protocol
should be robust enough to mitigate the effects of node
outages by providing an alternate route.
E. Physical Attacks
As we have mentioned repeatedly that sensor network
operate in outdoor environment mostly which make highly
susceptible to physical attack. This code be physical node
destruction. This attack is different from others in the sens
that here a node can be permanently damaged or destroyed.
F. False Node
In this kind of attack a node is added by an adversary,
which causes injection of false data. A node can be added
to the system, which feeds false data or prevents the real
data. This is the most dangerous attack cause a malicious
code injected in the network could spread to all nodes
which could potentially destroy the whole network. A
more worse case could be talking over the network on
behalf of an adversary.
G.Node Replication Attacks
In this kind of Attack a node is added to the existing
sensor network by copying the node ID of an existing
sensor node. This can severely disrupt the sensor network
performance. The packet can be misrouted or even
corrupted, which can lead to disconnected network or false
sensor reading etc. Once the attacker get physical access to
the entire network, it can copy the keys to the replicated
sensor nodes.
H.Passive information Gathering
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If the sensor network is not encrypted, an adversary
having powerful resources can collect information from it.
If the intruder is:
 Appropriate power receiver
 Well designed antenna
Then it can easily pick off the data stream. If the
message interception contains the physical location of
sensor nodes then it allows attacker to locate the node and
destroy them. The adversary can observe the specific
content of a message that include timestamps, message IDs
and other fields. Strong encryption techniques needs to be
used in order to prevent passive information gathering.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
Wireless sensor networks are highly vulnerable against
attacks, it is very important to adopt some mechanisms that
can protect the network from all kinds of attacks. It must
be ensure that the system is protected before, during and
after any kind of attack. The most important tools that
ensure security and its services are the security primitives
[10]. Those primitives are symmetric key encryption
(SKE), public key cryptography (PKC) and hash functions
[11]. SKE and Hash functions are the primitives that can
be called the building blocks which offer a basic protection
of the information flow, because these assure the
confidentiality and integrity of the channel. Public key
cryptography assure protection from the participation of
external entities and also eliminate the problem of a
malicious insider which try to use more than one identity.
PKC assures this by allowing authentication of the peers
involved in the information exchange. Based on the
primitives it is possible to create a better network services.
It is also equally important to have a key management
system for constructing a secure key infrastructure.
A. Methods and protocols classification
Most methods based on symmetric, asymmetric or
hybrid systems solve the problem of key establishment
through a predistribution phase. The predistribution of
encryption keys in a WSN is the fact of storing these keys
in the memory nodes before deployment. In literature, we
find several classifications of
cryptographic key management systems, such as papers in
[12] - [14]. Some classifications methods are based on key
sharing between two nodes (Pair-wise) or more nodes
(Group-wise), and others rely on exploiting the
probabilities, combinatory analysis, etc.
We chose to make a classification, which includes all
key management and distribution models into two large
families. The first family contains the asymmetrical
schemes and the second includes the symmetrical
schemes. Figure 4 illustrates this classification. In the
following, we will detail the main models in literature.
Fig. 4. Key management models
B. Symmetric Schemes The schemes in this category use symmetric
mechanisms in order to establish a common key between
two nodes in a WSN. This is accomplished in three steps:
Key management and distribution schemes
Asymmetric Symmetric
Random key
predistribution
Munivel et al. (micro-PKI)
Watro et al. (TyniPK)
ZigBee (PKKE)
ZigBee (CBKE)
Lederer et al.
ZigBee (PKKE)
Oliviera et al. (TyniPBC)
Jing et al. (C4W)
Jeong et al.
Perrig et al. (SPINS)
Karlof et al. (TyniSec)
Zhu et al. (LEAP)
ZigBee (SKKE)
Dini et al. (S2RP)
Eshenauer et al.
Chang et al.
Jones et al.
Chan et perrig
(PIKE)
Liu et al.
Çamtepe et al.
Lee et al.
Based on PKI Based on nodes
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Master key
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 Key predistribution: keys stored in memory before
deployment constitute the key ring of node. If there
is a common key between two nodes, they can create
a secure connection between them.
 Shared-key discovery: After deploying the
communication protocol is responsible for
discovering the common key between two
neighboring nodes.
 Path-key establishment: if there is no common key
between two nodes wishing to communicate, there
must then find a secure path between them. This path
goes through a set of nodes that already contains
secure links. Once the path established, the two
nodes can use it to secure communication.
We present in the following symmetrical schemes
according to the decomposition of figure 4.
1. SPINS
SPINS is a suite of security building blocks proposed by
Perig and several other authors in [15].  It is optimized for
resource constrained environments and wireless
communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks:
SNEP and μTESLA. SNEP uses a shared counter between
the two communicating parties and applies the counter in
calculating encryption and a message authentication code
(MAC) to provides data confidentiality, semantic  security,
data    integrity,    two-party    data    authentication,    replay
protection,  and  weak  message  freshness.  What’s  more,
the protocol  also  has  low  communication  overhead,  for
the counter state is kept at each end point and the protocol
only adds 8 bytes per message. For applications requiring
strong freshness,    the    sender    creates    a    random
nonce    (an unpredictable 64-bit value) and includes it in
the request message to the receiver. The receiver generates
the response message and includes the nonce in the MAC
computation. μTESLA provides  authenticated broadcast
for severely resource-constrained environments.  μTESLA
constructs authenticated broadcast from symmetric
primitives, but introduces asymmetry with delayed key
disclosure and one-way function key chains. SPINS
realizes an authenticated routing application and a security
two-party key agreement with SNEP and μTESLA
separately with low storage, calculation and
communication consumption. However, SPINS still have
some underlying problems as follows:
 It doesn’t consider the possibility of DOS attack;
 Due to use the pairwise key pre-distribution scheme I
the security routing  protocol,  SPINS rely  on  the
base station excessively;
 SPINS doesn’t consider the update of communication
key. There must be practical key update mechanism to
realize forward security;
 SPINS can’t solve the problem of hidden channel leak
and compromise node.
2. LEAP
LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication
Protocol) is a key management protocol for sensor
networks that is designed to support in-network processing
with the prime goal at the same time to restrict the security
impact of a node which is compromised to the immediate
network neighborhood. The idea of leap+ was motivated
after having this interesting observation that different
types of messages that are exchanged between sensor
nodes have different requirements of security. This
observation gives the conclusion that a single keying
mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different
security requirements [16] [17] [18]. For each node leap+
support the establishment of four types of keys:
 Individual key: Shared with the base station;
 Pairwise key: Shared with another sensor node;
 Cluster Key: Shared with multiple neighboring nodes;
 Global key: Shared by all nodes in the network.
The packets that each node exchanged in a sensor
network can be classified into several categories, which is
based on different criteria for example:
 Control packets vs Data packets
 Broadcast Packets Vs Unicast Packets
 Queries or commands Vs Sensor readings and so on.
The security requirement for each packet is different it
depends on the category it falls in. Almost all type of
packets requires authentication while confidentiality is
only for some types of packets. Here it is mentioned that
single keying mechanism is not appropriate for all the
secure communication that are needed in sensor networks.
3. Tinysec
Karlof et al. [19] propose the TinySec Protocol, the first
full implementation of a secure architecture at the data link
layer for WSN. This implementation supports two security
options: a message authentication with data encryption
(TinySec-EA) and authentication of messages without data
encryption (TinySec-Auth). As SPINS, TinySec uses
standard cryptographic algorithms to ensure privacy and
message integrity check. The authors of Tinysec find that
Skipjack algorithm [20] is more suitable for WSN than
RC5 (algorithm used by SPINS). Indeed, evaluations of
TinySec have shown that RC5 needs a pre-key calculation
using 104 bytes of RAM. TinySec uses the CBC
encryption mode (Cipher Block Chaining) instead of the
CTR (used by SPINS). Indeed, the CTR will provide for
more packet encryption the same random numbers. These
numbers are used primarily in the production of the
encryption keys sequences, their repetition can weaken the
security level of this solution and subsequently allowing
adversaries to discover the content of messages. TinySec
is an implementation rather than a key distribution
proposal, he comes to complete a key distribution method
suited to the expanded network. Two nodes need two
shared symmetric key to communicate. The first is used to
encrypt messages and the second for calculating MAC
(code) messages.
C.Asymmetric schemes
The schemes in this category use the mechanisms of
asymmetric systems in order to establish a common key
between two nodes or a group of nodes of a WSN.
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1. micro-PKI
Munivel et al. [21] propose a method for WSN
called micro-PKI (Public Key Infrastructure Micro), a
simplified version of conventional PKI. The base station
has a public key and another private. The public key is
used by the network nodes to authenticate the base
station, and the private key is used by the base station to
decrypt data sent from the nodes. Before deployment, the
public key of the base station is stored in all nodes. The
authors include in their scheme two types of
authentication (HandShake). The first type of
authentication occurs between a network node and the
base station. The node generates a symmetric session key
and encrypts it with the public key of the base station. To
ensure the integrity of messages exchanged, the authors
propose to integrate with each message a MAC (code)
using the same encryption key of the message. For new
nodes who wish to join the network, they simply store in
these nodes, the public key of the base station before
deployment.
2. TinyPK
Watro et al. [22] proposed a method called TinyPK
based on the use of public keys and the principle of Diffie-
Hellman to establish a secret key between two nodes in a
WSN. TinyPK uses a trusted authority to sign the public
keys of nodes. The CA key is predistributed to all nodes
before deployment so they can check key neighbors after
deployment. The choice of the RSA algorithm for
encryption involves a great consumption of time and
energy of the nodes. Thus, the basic operations can take
dozen seconds, which will reduce the network lifetime as
well as impact on reactivity.
3. PKKE & CBKE
The PKKE and CBKE protocols proposed by Zigbee
using the identity of nodes in their method of key
establishment. The goal is to use these identities to create
a single shared key between each pair of nodes in a
network. However, the creation of the shared key is
performed with interactions between the two nodes. It
means, methods require sending and receiving multiple
messages on both sides before the creation of the key. To
save power nodes that want to share a secret and those
intermediate nodes, several methods have been proposed
to remove these interactions. These methods are known
in the field of cryptography as the ID-NIKDS [23]
(Identity-Based Non-Interactive Key Distribution
Scheme).
4. C4W
Jing et al. [24] proposed a method called C4W based on
the use of the identity of nodes to calculate public keys. The
nodes themselves are able to calculate the public keys of
other nodes using their identities. What could replace the
role of a certificate. Before deployment, the nodes and the
base station are loaded with their own keys (private / public
key ECC) and public information on the network nodes.
The C4W method uses the principle of Diffie-Hellman key
exchange to create a single shared key between two nodes
without using certificates
IV. Analysis and discussion
A. Analyses method
Several criteria are taken into account in order to
compare the different methods for key management. We
present in Figure 5 the most important criteria. We begin
by the limitation of the resources of nodes. The proposed
key management method must consider the fact that the
nodes have been deployed to collect the information. They
need their memory space to store their data and their
embedded energy to ensure their application role. The
solution must also be flexible and dynamic, and able to go
to the scale (scalability). Another criterion, which must be
respected, is the resilience against attacks. When capturing
nodes for example, the opponent can use the information
stored to implement other attacks and manipulate the
network. The key management method must be able to
detect compromised nodes and authenticate network nodes
before distributing the keys. The last criterion is the
renewal and revocation of keys. We can put it at the same
level of importance as key distribution. An expired key or
discovered by an opponent must be revoked. The keys
secure links also need to be renewed periodically. The
connectivity of a network is the guarantee of its nodes to
have more secure paths to send its data. The method of
keys distribution must be capable of ensuring a good
network connectivity. The case of a departure or a capture
of a node may limit the connectivity of other nodes with
the network. The distribution method must take into
account this factor by proposing new secure paths.
Fig. 5. The criteria for comparison of methods of key management of
RCSF
B. Comparison and discussion
We have studied different types of distribution and key
establishment in the WSN and we have class the diagrams
of these different types in figure 4.  In table I, we compare
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these diagrams based on the criteria of comparison in
figure 5. Note that the memory storage evaluated in the
table takes into account only the size of keys stored in the
nodes and not the size of the code algorithms and
cryptographic primitives. The stars in the table shall
designate a quality. We have established three, two or one
black star in the column "Connectivity" to note that the
diagrams have respectively a high, medium or low
connectivity. Then we have established three, two or one
star in the column "Resistance against the attacks "to note
that the diagrams have respectively a high, medium or low
resistance against attacks. On the other hand, the circle in
the table shall designate a default. We have three, two or
one black circle in the column "Cost resources used" to
note that the diagrams respectively cost a high, medium
and low-resource utilization.
Table 1. Comparison of the proposed key management schemes for WSN. In this table circle is used to indicate a fault, while the star designate a quality.
The diagrams SPINS and LEAP use master keys in the key
establishment. This reduces the storage of keys in the
memory of the nodes. However, the resistance to attacks is
low. Given that the master key can be compromised at any
time, the keys established after the deployment by using
this key can be compromised also. By adopting a
symmetric system, they are the most suitable and among
the most rapid in terms of calculation. Note that the
symmetric diagrams are costly in operations (if they exist)
of renewal and revocation of keys since they use secret
keys in order to exchange other secret keys. The problem
is simpler in the asymmetric diagrams since the public
keys do not need to be secret.
The scheme Chan et al., Representing probabilistic
diagrams shows that consumes low power and do not
require much computing capacity. However, large sizes
key rings stored in the memory nodes before deployment
makes this scheme one of the most expensive symmetrical
schemes in terms of memory occupation. It cannot resist to
attacks of type physical nodes captures. While PIKE
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scheme provides better connectivity between network
nodes, but it shows low performance in term of scalability.
We can see that the schema TinyPBC is the most suitable
of asymmetric patterns. It is resistant to most known
attacks in the RCSF. The fact of using the coupling in order
to establish a unique key shared between two nodes has
helped reduce the need for large storage capacity in
memory. In addition, the creation of this key is performed
without interaction between the nodes which saves the
time of calculation and the energy consumed due to these
interactions. The diagrams using the principle of
certificates and PKI remain the most expensive in
calculation and in energy consumption.
The comparison between the diagrams symmetrical and
asymmetrical may differ depending on the desired level of
security in the network. We note in the table of comparison
that the symmetric diagrams can be chosen for their
timeliness and the asymmetric diagrams for their
resistance against attacks.
V. Conclusion
We have presented in this paper, a state of the art, which
detailed the attacks threatening the WSN. To face those
attacks, we have presented a synthesis of cryptography
systems and mechanisms that can secure the WSN. The
lack of infrastructure such as PKI in the WSN has
compelled the nodes to not have confidence in network and
to create secure paths from the source of the data to the
base station. Works like [29] have used the identities of the
nodes and the principle of coupling in order to reduce, or
even eliminate, the interactions between nodes to counter
a maximum of attacks. However, to date there is no
complete and dynamic solutions easily adaptable to WSN.
All the methods we have discussed in this paper have great
advantages when dedicated to specific applications and
network topologies. However, it is difficult if not
impossible to adapt them to other kinds of applications or
make them polyvalent and universal.
The current secure routing protocols such as LEAP and
SPINS are mature in the routing performance.  In  the
design  of  secure  routing  protocol,  if through a small
amount of change we can achieve security purposes,  the
expansion  of  the  original  protocol  can  also offers a
good research method. Such as SRD, INTRSN, etc.
Furthermore, this direction is our research direction in the
future.
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